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Abstract  
 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, Auditing and 
Financial Management, at the International Hellenic University.  
 
Auditor and client relationship has been the center of attention for the past decades. 
Economic scandals around the world have intrigued stakeholders to inquiry this relationship 
as well as raising questions about the quality of earnings. We assess this relationship by 
examining a sample of 3.000 European firm –year observations for the period 2012 – 2016. 
Our results are in line with prior literature, supporting that high audit fees are indicative of 
higher audit quality. We do not find satisfying evidence that client importance affects 
auditor’s opinion. However, we document that the increased provision of non-audit services 
causes auditor’s to place greater restraints in earnings manipulation, in order to safeguard 
their increased investment in reputational capital. Also, we observed that audit quality 
increased, when then were was a change of auditor, indicating that new auditors are stricter 
to earnings manipulation. These findings are robust to a number of sensitivity check 
regarding earnings management benchmarks and regional characteristics.  
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I. Introduction  
Earnings manipulation as described by Healy and Wahlen (1999) occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to 
either mislead part of the stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual .outcomes that depend on reported accounting practices. 
This is perceived as a widespread phenomenon that is a consequence of separating ownership 
from control in public companies. This segregation emerges a conflict of interest among 
principals (shareholders) and the agents (managers) under which the latter might not reveal 
the truth due to immense contracting costs (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). Shareholders 
often cannot fully comprehend management actions that lead to information asymmetry 
derived from the costly communication in the market (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Ronen 
and Yaari, 2008; Walker 2013). Under this notion, agents might exercise discretion upon 
financial reporting within the boundaries of Generally Accepted Accounting Standards 
(GAAP) (Harris and Raviv, 1979; Fama, 1980; Strong and Walker, 1987; Walker, 2013).   
 
Mulford and Comiskey (2002) have described that earnings management could be influenced 
both by internal and external parties such as forecasts made by analysts, predetermined 
targets set by the management or a specific amount that is consistent with a smoother and 
more sustainable earnings stream. In order to explain earnings management behavior, prior 
literature has identified three distinct motives that firstly arise from contracting deficiencies 
in the contract terms among firms and its stakeholders. Another pattern that has been 
recognized is capital market motives associated with inefficiencies of stock markets and 
finally motives that are determined by external parties that influence the cost of 
communicating information in the market (Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Walker, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, previous studies
1
 have identified the aforementioned motives and pinpointed 
the factors that influence them such as management compensation, CEO turnover, 
managerial ability, loans and corporate governance. Regarding external motives literature
2
 
has analyzed the impact of industry, industrial diversification, accounting standards, tax 
                                                 
1
 Godfrey et al. 2003; Boone et al. 2004; Defond and Francis, 2005; Yu, 2008;  Iatridis and Kadorinis, 2009; 
Laux and Laux, 2009; Demerjian et al. 2013 
2
 Bagnoli,  Watts 2000, Goldman and Slezak 2006, Jiraporn et al. 2006, Barth et al. 2008 
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considerations, suppliers and customers, political environment, competitors and country 
specific policies. 
 
Nonetheless as per Ronen and Yaari (2008) study, it is of vital importance to understand that 
manipulation of earnings is not necessarily a bearer of bad news, thus they proceed by 
distinguishing two certain categories of real and accrual earnings manipulation and provide 
the following definition: “Earnings management is a collection of managerial decisions that 
result in not reporting the true short-term, value-maximizing earnings as known to 
management. Earnings management can be beneficial: it signals long-term value; 
pernicious: it conceals short- or long-term value; neutral: it reveals the short-term true 
performance. The managed earnings result from taking production/investment actions before 
earnings are realized or making accounting choices that affect the earnings numbers and 
their interpretation after the true earnings are realized” Ronen and Yaari (2008, p.5). 
Previous research on earnings manipulation (Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986; Jones, 1991) 
indicate that high discretionary accruals translate to earnings manipulations. Hence, high 
discretionary accruals should be reasonably associated with audit qualifications. Nonetheless, 
numerous factors exist that can lead to audit qualifications. Literature has identified a number 
of such variables covering operational complexity and various types of risks. 
Following the preceding discussion, we are trying to identify how audit quality is affected by 
the client’s and auditor’s characteristics. We define audit quality as the value of discretionary 
accruals computed as per Modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) while controlling for 
client’s and auditor’s attributes through estimating four main variables:  Auditor Switch, 
Audit Fees, Non – Audit Fees and Client Importance. In order to attest these relationships, we 
proceed by formulating four hypotheses where on the first we assume that when audit fees 
increase, discretionary accruals should decrease as a result of higher audit quality. Then we 
hypothesize that the provision of non-audit services impacts auditor’s opinion. We also claim 
that client’s importance can lead to loss of auditor’s independence and finally assess how 
auditor’s tenure affects earnings management.  
 
Prior evidence supports that increased fees paid to the auditors can positively impact audit 
quality (Hoitash et al. 2007; Abbott et al. 2004). On the other hand, the provision of non-
audit services might impair auditor’s independence as the auditor becomes reluctant on 
placing constraints on earnings manipulation in the fear of losing profitable fees (DeAngelo, 
1981; Simunic, 1984). Auditing literature findings suggest that audit quality of Big4 is 
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remarkably higher when compared with that of non-Big4 auditors (DeAngelo, 1981). 
Another argument is that larger audit firms are capable of providing higher audit quality due 
to the fact that they are exposed to greater reputational risks (Dopuch and Simunic, 1980). 
Regarding auditor tenure, legal framework mandates auditor rotation but prior literature 
findings appear to be contradicting where Balsam et al. (2003) claim that audit quality 
increases with longer auditor tenure. While, the findings of Chi et al. (2010) suggest that 
longer auditor tenure is associated with greater earnings management.  
 
Using data from Bloomberg database our research provides evidence in accord with prior 
literature
3
 suggesting that high audit fees translate to higher audit quality, therefore lower 
earnings manipulation. Contrary to our expectations, we identified that the provision of non-
audit services are negatively associated with earnings management, which  can be reasonably 
explained by the findings of Arruiada et al. (1999) where he suggests that auditors tend to 
place greater constraints in order to protect their increased investment in reputational capital. 
With respect to our client importance hypothesis, our study has not identified a significant 
association with earnings management similar to the findings of Ashbaugh et al. (2002); 
Francis and Yu (2009). With respect to our last hypothesis, we found that audit quality is 
impaired by longer auditor tenure a result which is consistent with the study of Chi et al. 
(2010). 
 
This research contributes to the existing literature on earnings management by providing 
evidence on the association of clients and auditors characteristics to audit quality on 
European listed firms. Although, prior studies have focused heavily on earnings management 
and audit quality on US firms little is known about the impact of client’s and auditor’s 
characteristics to earnings management. To the extent of our knowledge, this is one of the 
first studies to provide direct evidence on earnings management based on European firms.   
Our findings ought to be interpreted with due regard to their limitations and to the caveats of 
matching models, discussed at full length in the rest of our research. Our study has not 
resolved the question as to whether client importance is capable of affecting an auditor’s 
opinion, but we hope that it inspires other researchers to apply different methodologies that 
further explain client characteristics. 
 
                                                 
3
 Becker et al. 1998; Johnson et al. 2002; Balsam et al. 2003; Srinidhhi and Gul et al. 2006; Ashbaugh et al 
2003 
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The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. On section two we provide our 
discussion based on prior research and we develop our hypotheses. Section three presents the 
selected sample and research design. We discuss our empirical findings along with our 
sensitivity and robustness tests. Ultimately, on our last chapter we conclude our study. 
 
II. Prior Research and Hypothesis 
i. Audit Fees and Audit Quality 
Hoitash et al. (2007) analyze various firms for the period 2000-2003 in order to investigate 
the linkage among fees paid to auditors and audit quality. In specific, they provide an 
overview of fees paid to auditors within the context that auditor profitability captures more 
efficiently the relation between audit quality and auditor independence. Furthermore, they 
confirm that pre and post-SOX there is a rational and persistent economic bond which 
determines the behaviour of an auditor despite any reputational concerns. Their findings also 
demonstrate that there is a positive and significant relationship between the size of the client 
and the abnormal fees paid to the auditor. 
 
Choi et al. (2009) examined how the size of a city-based audit engagement office impacts 
audit quality, therefore audit fees in comparison with a national level audit firm as the former 
is a semi-autonomous unit within an audit firm, having its own client base. They examined a 
sample of 19.499 US firm with yearly observations over the period of 2000 - 2005. They 
have formed two hypotheses where on H1 they claim that “Audit quality, measured by 
unsigned abnormal accruals, is not associated with the size of a local engagement office, 
other things being equal”. They proxy for audit quality, by using unsigned abnormal accruals 
and their results reveal that this is significantly higher for larger offices which is consistent 
with the economic dependence perspective. Consequently, larger offices are less 
economically dependent on clients and it is more likely to resist substandard or biased 
reporting. Furthermore, they form the second hypothesis where on H2 they claim that “Audit 
fees paid to auditors are not associated with the size of a local engagement office, other 
things being equal”. Their findings revealed that audit fees are remarkably higher for larger 
offices in comparison with the smaller offices, evidence that is consistent with the rejection 
of the null hypothesis, H2. 
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On  a research conducted by Srinidhi et al. (2007) on 4.551 US firms, over the period 2000-
2003 they evaluate whether auditors take into consideration the informativeness of earnings 
and accruals in order to set up their audit plan and determine the pricing. Extensive research 
on prior literature has led them to formulate the following hypothesis: “The informativeness 
in earnings and accruals, namely, total accruals, and discretionary accruals is negatively 
associated with audit fees, ceteris paribus”. Their findings are consistent with the 
aforementioned hypothesis along with prior literature and they confirm that there is a 
negative relationship between audit fee and the informativeness of earnings, total accruals 
and abnormal accruals. The notion behind this analysis is that auditors have access to private 
information and the enticement to amass such information in order to refine the 
informativeness in accruals and earnings. This knowledge allows them to adjust accordingly 
their audit plan and the pricing as information could impact the economic environment of an 
organization. Moreover, they found evidence consistent with prior literature that investors 
could potentially use the audit information in order to price a firm higher if the abnormal 
audit fee is low and vice versa. 
 
A similar study by Abbott et al. (2004) examined proxies, filled in the SEC during February 
2001 and June 2001 over 429 firms in order to identify the asymmetric association among 
auditor’s assessment of litigation risk and earnings management. They made two claims 
where on H1: “Audit fees decrease (increase) with income decreasing (increasing) 
discretionary accruals as a result of asymmetric litigation risk assessments” and the second 
hypothesis suggests that H2: “Audit fee effects resulting from a client’s propensity to manage 
earnings upward will be magnified for clients within greater litigation risk environments as 
identified by ‘high-growth’ or high price-earnings (P/E) clients”. Their findings suggested 
that audit fees decreased with client’s propensity to manage earnings downward and this 
relation is increased for clients who operate in higher risk litigation environments. 
Furthermore, they found that discretionary accruals are increased when associated with lower 
audit fees and that the interaction of industry-adjusted price-earnings ratio and discretionary 
accruals has an incrementally significant and positive effect on fees. 
 
Following the aforementioned, we conclude on our first hypothesis where we claim that:  
 
H1: Higher audit fees translate to higher audit quality, therefore lower earnings 
management. 
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ii. Provision of Non-Audit Fees and Discretionary Accruals 
A research by Frankel et al. (2002) tried to identify the association between auditor fees and 
earnings management and how the market reacts on the disclosure of audit fees by examining 
3.074 US firms which filled proxy statements on the SEC between January 2001 and June 
2001. In order to assess the former association, they claim that H1a: “The provision of non-
audit services to audit clients is not associated with earnings management” and H1b: “The 
provision of audit services is not associated with earnings management”. Their findings 
suggest that there is a positive association between non-audit fees and the likelihood of 
reporting a small earnings surprise. When comparing audit fees and earnings management 
indicators they identified a negative and significant association among them. On the other 
hand, they did not find any association among non-audit fees and the likelihood of reporting a 
small increase in earnings. When, examining total audit fees they also did not observe any 
linkage with earnings management indicators. Regarding the reaction of the market to audit 
fees, they formulated following two hypotheses where on H2a they suggest that “There is no 
share price reaction to the disclosure of non-audit fees” and on H2b that “There is no share 
price reaction to the disclosure of audit fees”. Their tests revealed that the disclosures of 
non-audit fees are negatively associated with share prices although the reaction in small 
economic terms is insignificant. 
 
Another study by Defond et al. (2002) examined 944 distressed US firms which had filled a 
proxy statement in the SEC between February 2001 and May 2001 in order to evaluate if the 
provision of non-audit services impair auditor independence when the auditor has issued a 
going concern opinion. They formulated two hypotheses where on the first they suggested 
that “Ceteris paribus, non-audit service fees are inversely related to auditors’ propensity to 
issue going concern audit opinions”. Their second hypothesis claimed that “Ceteris paribus, 
total fees are inversely related to auditors’ propensity to issue going concern audit 
opinions”. Their findings did not provide any evidence that non-audit fees impair auditor's 
independence. However, they observed that auditors tend to issue a going concern opinion to 
clients paying higher audit fees, which implies that they treat those clients with greater 
independence. 
 
Srinidhi and Gul (2006) on their study, they examined a sample of 4.282 US firms over the 
period 2000-2001 in order to assess the relationship between audit and non-audit fees and 
accrual quality. They measured accrual quality as defined by Francis et al. (2005) model 
7 
 
which is the absolute value of the residual in the regression with the total current accruals as 
the dependent variable with the previous, current and subsequent period operating cash flows, 
the change in revenue and the level of property, plant and equipment as the independent 
variables. Their findings support that accrual quality is significantly negatively associated 
with non-audit fees that translates to economic bonding, loss of independence and consequent 
loss of audit quality, while audit fees have a significant and positive association resulting in 
higher accrual quality. 
 
Taking into consideration the aforementioned contradicting studies and the legal framework 
regarding mandatory auditor rotation
4
 we form the following hypotheses:  
 
H2: Higher non- audit fees create an economic bonding between auditor and auditee, which 
increases the chances of earnings manipulation. 
 
iii. Clients Importance and Auditor’s Independence 
Chung and Kallapur (2003) in their study tried to identify the association between abnormal 
accruals and client importance by using ratios of client fees and non-audit fees divided by the 
audit firm's US revenues. The notion behind this research is that they use the economic 
theory of auditor independence to incentivize their choice of client importance and proxy for 
auditor's incentives to compromise their independence. Their sample consisted of 1.871 US 
firms that after the changes on the SEC - SEC Final Rule (SEC 2000) disclosure was required 
in proxy statements beginning from February 5, 2001 and June 30, 2001. Based on previous 
literature they are using the absolute Jones-model abnormal accruals of audit clients as 
measures of earnings and thus, audit quality. Their findings revealed low significance among 
abnormal accruals and any of the measures of client importance that is not attributed to lack 
of power of their tests as they rejected the hypothesis that the difference in abnormal accruals 
between firms at the first and third quartiles by client importance is as high as the difference 
found in previous studies between abnormal accruals of clients of Big6 and non-Big6 
auditors. 
 
                                                 
4
 According to European Regulation No. 537/2014, as of 17 June 2016, public interest entities (PIE) are 
obliged to mandatory firm rotation (MFR). 
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Francis and Yu on 2009 through their study investigated the association between Big4 
auditors and the size of the client. Their sample consisted of 6.568 US firms for the period 
2003-2005 and their results reveal that Big-Four auditors provide audit reports of higher 
quality for larger clients. In more detail, their findings suggest that larger clients audited by 
Big-Four auditors are less likely to manage their earnings so as to report small earnings and 
consequently avoid losses. Therefore, larger clients audited by Big4 report smaller abnormal 
accruals. However, there is no convincing evidence that audit quality is significantly lower in 
smaller firms. 
 
Ashbaugh et al. (2002) conducted a study which examined the findings of Frankel et al. 
(2002) by assessing how auditor’s independence affects discretionary accruals. Their sample 
consisted of 3,170 US firms for the fiscal year of 2000. They measured auditor's 
independence as the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees of the audit firm and audit fees 
to total audit fees of the audit firm. Nevertheless, they argued that the ratio of non-audit fees 
to total audit fees necessarily captures the economic importance of the client to the audit firm. 
They acknowledged the fact that the fee ratio illustrates the relative monetary value of non-
audit services in comparison with audit fees services as they could have a potential impact on 
the perception of independence as previous studies
5
 suggested. Their findings are not 
consistent with prior literature as they found no significant association on earnings 
benchmarks tests and auditor's characteristics, thus they claim that auditors do not necessarily 
violate their independence when their clients purchase higher amount of non-audit services. 
 
Bauwhede et al. (2003) in their study, developed three hypothesis regarding earnings 
management on Belgian companies. Their sample consisted of 352 Belgian public and 
privately held companies for the period of 1991 - 1997. On the first hypothesis, they assumed 
that “Belgian companies irrespective of their size manage their earnings so as to meet their 
benchmark target of prior-year earnings”.  Their second hypothesis considered that: “Big4 
restrains significantly earnings management, hence the use of discretionary accruals in order 
to meet earnings target”. The last assumption supported that companies which are publicly 
owned have incentives to manage their earnings upwards; hence the discretionary accruals 
are positively affected. They concluded, that regardless of the size of the auditee and the type 
of ownership, companies do manage their earnings so as to meet their benchmarks. 
                                                 
5
 DeAngelo, 1981; Simunic, 1984; Beck et al. 1988; Magee and Tseng, 1990 
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Furthermore, the other two hypotheses were valid under the condition that their earnings 
were above the target and they had incentives to smooth earnings downwards. 
 
Reynolds and Francis (2001) on their research tried to assess the effect of client size on 
auditor’s opinion at the office level of Big-Five account firms. They examined a sample of 
6.747 US firms for the fiscal year of 1996 in order to identify if large clients had the 
capability to create economic dependence that could potentially influence auditors to 
compromise their independence and report favourably in order to retain valuable clients. By 
the term economic dependence, they referred to the client's size compared to the size of the 
office that contracted for the audit and issued the audit report. In order to support this, they 
formed three hypotheses where on H1 they claim that: “Economic dependence causes 
auditors to report more favourably for large clients. The larger a client relative to the 
portfolio of clients served by a given office, the more discretion a client has with respect to 
accounting accruals”. In the same notion, they claimed on H2 that: “Economic dependence 
causes auditors to report favourably for large clients. For larger clients in the portfolio of 
clients served by a given office, the variance of accounting accruals is greater than for 
smaller clients”. Furthermore, on H3 they claimed that “Economic Dependence causes 
auditors to report more favourably for large clients. The larger a client relative to the 
portfolio of clients served by a given office, the less likely the auditor will issue a going 
concern report”. 
 
 On H1 their findings revealed that their variable INFLUENCE was positively associated 
with accruals and negatively associated with discretionary accrual and total accruals. This 
translates that larger clients in offices of Big5 firms had lower levels of accruals, therefore 
the claim of economic dependence was not valid and H1 was rejected as auditors are actually 
more conservative when reporting for larger clients in offices. Regarding H2, evidence 
showed that the greater the discretion is on larger clients in reporting accruals the greater the 
cross-sectional variance will be when comparing with smallest clients. Thus, those 
differences indicated that larger clients had lower variance in accruals than smaller clients 
which actually rejected the H2 hypothesis. Summing the tests of H1 and H2 the findings 
reveal that Big-Five auditors actually reported more conservatively for larger clients in local 
practice offices due to higher litigation risks or reputational risks. Also, they rejected the third 
hypothesis as INFLUENCE was weakly significant associated with going concern reports, 
hence auditors in local offices issue more conservative reports for larger clients that are 
10 
 
potentially distressed.  This is consistent with the protection of reputation that drives the 
auditor reporting behaviour rather than economic dependence on fees. This leads us to 
formulate our next hypothesis which is divided into (a) and (b): 
 
H3 (a): High client importance leads auditors to more conservative reports, thus lower 
discretionary accruals. 
 
H3 (b): Client importance does not affect auditor’s opinion. 
 
iv. Effects of Auditor Tenure on Discretionary accruals 
Chi et al. (2010) they examined a sample of 925 global firms for the years between 2001 and 
2008 in order to investigate whether firms resorted to real earnings management when their 
ability to manage accruals was restrained by higher quality auditors.  Therefore, they 
formulate the following hypothesis that “Audit quality, as operationalized by auditor 
industry expertise and the presence of a Big N audit firm, is associated with higher levels of 
real earnings management among firms with incentives to manage earnings”. Their evidence 
were consistent with prior literature that city level auditor industry expertise and Big-Four 
auditors can actually constrain accrual management leading firms to resort to real earnings 
management which proves to be more costly. Additionally, they proved that longer auditor 
tenure is correlated with greater real earning management that could potentially suggest 
merits of mandating audit firm rotation. 
 
Myers et al. (2003) they examined a sample of 42.302 US firms for the period 1988-2000 and 
they tried to identify the association of auditor tenure and audit quality. They measured audit 
quality by using absolute signed accruals and raw (unsigned) accruals in order to proxy for 
earnings quality. Their findings did not provide conclusive evidence on whether mandatory 
auditor rotation would improve earnings quality; however, their findings suggested that 
earnings quality deteriorated with extended auditor tenure. By formulating the following two 
hypotheses they tried to identify the association between auditor tenure and audit quality. On 
H1 they proposed that: “Audit quality (as measured by accounting accruals) is decreasing in 
auditor tenure where on H2: “Audit quality (as measured by accounting accruals) is 
increasing in auditor tenure”. Their results revealed that increased auditor tenure does not 
11 
 
translate to reduced audit or earnings quality but they are not suggestive that remaining with 
the same auditor would necessarily improve earnings quality or audit quality.  
 
According to the study conducted by Balsam et al. (2003), there is an association between the 
measures of earnings quality and the auditor's tenure. Their sample was restricted to US-
listed companies that were audited by Big 6 auditors.  In order to attest this, they formulated 
two hypotheses where on the first they presumed that H1: “The discretionary accruals of a 
company who was audited for more than 1 year by the same auditor were lower than the 
discretionary accruals of a company who were being audited by an auditor for less than a 
year”. While on the second hypothesis that “The earnings response coefficient of a company 
whose auditor tenure more than a year was greater than the earnings response coefficient of 
a company whose auditor tenure was less than a year”. Evidence of their research supported 
the H1 hypothesis. To be more specific, they identified that auditor's tenure and absolute 
discretionary accruals were negatively associated therefore longer auditor tenure reduced 
earnings management of their clients. Similarly, they noted that a positive association existed 
between auditor tenure and earnings response coefficient that translated to longer auditor 
tenure increasing the market's perception of their clients quality of earnings. 
This discussion leads us to formulate our last hypothesis where we claim that:  
 
H4: Longer auditor tenure can increase audit quality -as measured by accounting accruals- 
and thus reduce earnings management. 
  
12 
 
III. Data & Methodology 
i. Introduction 
In this chapter of our research, we will analyze the features of the obtained data, define our 
variables and explain the notion of the selected methodology in order to define earnings 
management. This chapter consists of four sections. At first we describe the collected sample 
so as to carry out our research, then we proceed by analyzing our methodology and next we 
analyze the control variables on our model and the rest of our variables. 
ii. Data 
In order to attest how earnings management are influenced by auditors, we examine an initial 
sample that was obtained through the Bloomberg database that consisted of the largest 600 
European firms based on market capitalization from 2012 to 2016. We had to exclude 2.273 
observations as we noticed that there were missing values in our data, accordingly our sample 
was reduced to 727 observations and 321 clusters of firms. Specifically, our sample focuses 
on 16 European countries with particular emphasis on the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany as per Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Description of the Data Sample: STOXX 600 constituents by country 
 
Country Freq. Percent Cum. 
United 
Kingdom 170 28.33 28.33 
France 87 14.50 42.83 
Germany 74 12.33 55.17 
Switzerland 48 8.00 63.17 
Sweden 45 7.50 70.67 
Italy 32 5.33 76.00 
Netherlands 31 5.17 81.17 
Spain 28 4.67 85.83 
Denmark 22 3.67 89.50 
Finland 16 2.67 92.17 
Belgium 14 2.33 94.50 
Norway 12 2.00 96.50 
Ireland 9 1.50 98.00 
Austria 7 1.17 99.17 
Portugal 3 0.50 99.67 
Czech 
Republic 2 0.33 100.00 
Total 600 100.00 
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In table 1 we illustrate the distribution among our sample by various classifications. This 
pPanel displays how our sample is distributed among the 16 European countries with a 
particular emphasis on the fact that over 50% of our data is accumulated in the United 
Kingdom (28,33%), followed by France (14,50%) and Germany (12,33%). The rest of our 
sample is compiled from 13 countries. 
 
iii. Methodology 
Our goal is to identify the relationship between discretionary accruals and audit fees, non-
audit fees and other measures of earnings management such as auditor's characteristics. Thus, 
we proceed by estimating a model that can predict how firms manage their earnings based on 
their size, region and auditor’s characteristics.   
 
Accruals measures have been used in numerous accounting studies that consider the 
relationship between earnings management and accruals behaviour, and earnings quality and 
accruals behaviour. Early studies used the change in total accruals as a measure of 
management discretion (e.g. Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986), while later studies adopted and 
modified the "Jones Model" (Jones, 1991)
6
. Thus, abnormal discretionary accruals (estimated 
using variations of the Jones Model) became the accepted proxy for extreme managerial 
discretion. Various accruals measures have also been used to study earnings quality. These 
studies
7
 are important to the audit quality issue because they generally find that information 
is contained in specific accruals and/or that earnings quality declines with extreme accruals. 
The preceding literature on earnings management and earnings quality provide evidence that 
extreme accruals are less desirable, consistent with the audit quality literature cited. 
 
We concluded using the modified Jones model based on the previous research of DeChow et 
al. (1995) as they provided persistent evidence that this model produces robust results both at 
1% and 5% significance level. Therefore we estimate earnings management through 
unexpected or discretionary accruals as per Modified Jones model which is the difference 
between a firm’s total accruals and normal accruals from our Equation (1):  
 
                                                 
6
 Dechow et al.1995; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000 
7
 Sloan, 1996; Thomas and Zhang, 2001; Xie 2001; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Richardson et al. 2002 
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The computation of total accruals can be approached in two ways either with the balance 
sheet or with the cash-flow-statement approach. On the former, total accruals are calculated 
as the change in current assets (except cash items) minus the change in current liabilities 
(except the current portion of long-term debt) minus depreciation. We have used the latter 
approach where total accruals are calculated as the difference between earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations and the operating cash flows instead of the 
balance sheet approach as according to Hribar and Collin (2002), they documented that this 
method produces more robust results. In particular, the estimation for total accruals and 
normal accruals were computed by the following Equations (2), (3):   
 
    
    
     
 
    
   
    
    
   
     
    
                
 
 
          
 
    
    
            
    
      
     
    
               
 
 
Where: 
Aavg = Average Total Assets 
ΔR = Changes in revenue from the current year to the previous year  
ΔAR= Changes in accounts receivables from the current year to the previous year 
PPE = Gross value of property, plant and equipment 
 
All variables were scaled by average total assets (Aavg) of the beginning and ending asset 
balances to avoid heteroscedasticity problems. A cross-sectional model was used in the 
calculations for each year and each country so that while taking the time influence into 
consideration the model controls for the regional variations. 
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To estimate how discretionary accruals  are affected by auditor’s and firm’s characteristics 
we use the following cross-section regression depicted on Equation (4):  
 
                                                          
                                                  
                                                       
 
            
                                 
                                                                                                                              
 
In further detail, WODA stands for the winsorized value of discretionary accruals, computed 
as previously. On our next subchapter we provide a detailed analysis upon the selection of 
each of our variables. 
 
iv. Control Variables 
According to prior research by Myers et al (2003), longer auditor tenure on average, resulted 
in auditors placing greater constraints on extreme decisions of the management when 
reporting financial performance. Furthermore, they observed that the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals declined significantly with longer auditor tenure. This proposition 
suggests that as this relationship increases, auditors limit further management decisions to 
use accruals to increase current period earnings. According to a study conducted by the 
AICPA's Quality Control Inquiry Committee of the SEC, they provided consisting evidence 
that audit quality is associated with audit tenure as the possibility of audit failure or omission 
appeared to be three times higher when an audit firm was performing its first or second audit 
of a given client. The above arguments are consistent with the research of Berton (1991); 
Petty and Cuganesan (1996). On the other hand, on a research conducted by Deis and Giroux 
(1992) found that auditor tenure and audit quality was negatively associated, however, it 
should be noted that their results could be questioned as their sample is incorporating only 
small and medium CPA firms. Identical research by Beck et al. (1988b); Lys and Watts 
(1994) provide evidence that independence was decreasing the length of auditor tenure. Thus, 
we proceeded and integrated into our model the variable AUDITOR_SWITCH that captures if 
the auditor has changed the previous year, and then it takes the value of 1. Since the majority 
of prior literature consents that longer auditor tenure can result in lower earnings 
management; it is reasonably expected to have a positive association with WODA. 
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In order to estimate auditor’s independence and audit quality, we use audit fees which are 
depicted by the variable WLAF that stands for the winsorized logarithm of audit fees. As 
Srinidhhi and Gul (2006) proposed on their research, higher audit effort leads to higher audit 
quality that translates to better accrual quality. Their findings suggest that accrual quality is 
positively associated with audit fees which is consistent with the proposition that higher audit 
fee reflects higher audit effort and better judgments about the propriety of accruals, but is not 
consistent with the proposition that audit fee is associated with economic bonding.  
 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) reported a negative association between audit fees and the probability 
of meeting their earnings benchmarks. Abbott et al. (2004) document increases in audit fees 
with client's risk of managing earnings upwards, resulting in earnings management surprises. 
Also, the existence of a fee premium in itself does not necessarily imply higher audit quality, 
especially if the Big4 auditors have more pricing power over their clients than do the non-
Big4 auditors (Francis 2004). Moreover, O'Keefe et al. (1994, 242) caution that “inferences 
about prices in such studies can be erroneous if the cross-sectional variations in auditor 
effort caused by differences in client characteristics are not adequately controlled”. 
Particular notice has to be taken that those earlier results are not definitive but they suggest 
that audit fees are indicative of high audit quality. Although previous studies on audit fees 
produced contradicting results we foresee a negative relationship between WLAF and WODA. 
 
Regarding the variable NAFEE which stands for non-audit fees, prior studies
8
 reveal that it 
can enhance the auditor's economic bond with the auditee, thus increasing the auditor's 
incentives to consent to client pressure and allow earnings management. The notion of this 
research is that when auditors receive both audit and non-audit fees from the auditee then a 
knowledge spillover is created that could potentially lead to economic bonding. Nonetheless, 
another argument provided by Arruiada (1999) is that the auditor is inclined to disagree with 
the client’s demands, as fees administered by non-audit services increase their investment in 
reputational capital. We depend on conventional measures of earnings management in order 
to proxy for such unobservable interventions and estimate the consequence of non-audit fees 
to discretionary accruals and earnings management. Past studies produced conflicting results 
                                                 
8
 Simunic, 1984; Beck et al. 1988a; Beeler and Hunton, 2001 
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when examining this variable, nevertheless, we reasonably expect a positive relationship with 
WODA. 
 
We define our next variable as IMPORT in order to capture the importance of each client to 
each audit firm on a national level by dividing audit fees to total audit fees per country. 
DeAngelo (1981a), Watts and Zimmerman (1981, 1986) define auditor independence as the 
probability that an auditor will report a discovered breach. DeAngelo (1981b) shows that an 
auditor's incentive to compromise independence with respect to a client depends on client 
importance, i.e., the ratio of quasi-rents specific to that client divided by the sum of all other 
quasi-rents. Although it has been derived by DeAngelo (1981b), we similarly assume this for 
our research in cross-sectional client characteristics that could be linked with an auditor that 
has developed an economic bond with the auditee. One interpretation that could support the 
use of the importance variable as a measure of auditor incentives to compromise 
independence is that large clients may inflict reputational losses or economic bonding. Chung 
and Kallapur (2003) yet during their studies they found a weak association among 
discretionary accruals and client importance, where their ratio is computed as the client audit 
fees divided by the audit firm's on a national level. With regards to the importance of clients, 
prior studies reveal contravene results. 
 
v. Rest Variables 
We have used the variable BIG4 that returns the value of 1 if the firm is audited by a Big4 
auditor, in order to proxy for a higher level of audit quality, therefore smaller magnitude of 
discretionary accruals an argument which is supported by previous studies.
9
 Moreover, prior 
research
10
 suggests that Big 5 auditors are less likely to allow earnings management than 
non-Big 5 auditors. 
 
As stated in previous studies, managers' motives are seemingly correlated with firm 
performance, (Guay et al 1996). Also, Roychowdhury (2006) states the likelihood that 
abnormal values from his estimation models having errors correlated with performance. 
Therefore he includes net income scaled by lagged total assets to his regressions. If the above 
                                                 
9
 See Beatty (1989), Guenther and Willenborg (1999), Mitton (2002), Smart and Zutter (2003), and Gul et al. 
(2009) 
10
 DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991, 1993; Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999 
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presumptions are valid then we expect that those variables that control for performance to 
restrict the power of our test. Taking into consideration the aforementioned evidence and 
recent reviews on earnings manipulation literature
11
 we incorporate on our mode the variable 
LRevenue so as to measure the size if each firm and it is the logarithm of revenues, ROA that 
it is return on assets and it is the income before extraordinary items divided by average total 
assets, OCFtoAsset_t - 1 that is cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total assets, LEV 
that stands for leverage it is represented as long term debt to  total assets and according to 
Defond and Jiambalvo (1994); DeAngelo et al. (1994); Becker et al. (1998) leverage is 
associated with the probability of violating covenants. Hence, high-leveraged firms are 
inclined to manage their earnings. LEV is measured as the ratio of long-term debt over total 
assets. In addition, we add another performance variable LMValue which is the logarithm of 
changes in market value and it is measured as the difference between current year to prior 
year. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) use the same variable and they provide evidence that 
this component of earnings is used to achieve earnings benchmarks. 
 
Regarding the LOSS and SPOS variable both are dummy variables and take the value of 1 if 
the firm has reported losses or if they report small positive earnings. Following the research 
of Brown (2001) and Frankel et al. (2002) the former has identified that when companies 
report losses are inclined to report positive earnings surprises. Specifically he noticed a 
strong recurrence of profits that either meet or exceed analyst estimates in every year of his 
research. Also, when there was a disclosure of good news, a significant positive trend in 
positive profits was observed and accordingly when adverse events took place a significant 
negative trend was noted. Frankel et al. (2002) they presented consisting evidence that there 
is a positive association between small earnings surprises and the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals 
 
Finally, we use geographical segment diversification to proxy for client opportunities to 
manage earnings, thus we incorporate in our model the dummy variables Country_ D* for 
each of our 16 countries and we separate each yearly observation with Year_D*. 
                                                 
11
 Dechow et al.( 1995); McNichols( 2000); Healy and Wahlen (1999); Fields et al. ( 2001) 
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IV. Empirical Findings 
i. Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, we provide information for all the variables used in our study. Table 2 reports 
descriptive statistics for the sample of our 321 firms.  The dependent variable WODA is 
winsorized at the upper and lower 5% respectively and the mean is 0,013 or 1,3% . This 
translates that on average our sample is manipulating its earnings by 1,3% , while the 
minimum value  corresponds to -7,8% and the maximum is as high as 10,2%.  Looking at the 
auditor –related control variables the natural logarithm of audit fees WLAF is also winsorized 
at the upper and lower 5%  level respectively and has a minimum value of 0.22 million 
Euros, a maximum value of 34,09 million Euros and a mean of 2,98 million Euros
12
.  We 
winsorized those two variables in order to reduce the effect of extreme outliers. We observe 
that for the variable NAFEE the mean value is 1,04 million Euros and the maximum value 
1,10 million Euros
12
. On the IMPORT variable, we notice that the ratio is on average 9,8% 
and the upper value fluctuates to 21,8%. Regarding the variable that attests if there has been a 
change of auditor the previous year AUDITO~H we found a mean of 0.210. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of all variables in the cross-sectional model 
 
 
stats mean p5 p50 p95 sd N 
WODA 0.013 -0.078 0.011 0.102 0.043 2.114.000 
WLAF 1.092 -1.519 1.065 3.529 1.451 2.151.000 
NAFEE 0.041 0.000 0.004 0.097 0.303 1.759.000 
IMPORT 0.098 0.000 0.010 0.215 1.355 2.056.000 
AUDITO~H 0.210 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.407 3.000.000 
BIG4 0.894 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.307 3.000.000 
LRevenue 8.748 6.055 8.745 11.332 1.655 2.941.000 
LMValue 7.308 4.789 7.250 9.868 1.579 2.001.000 
LEV 0.196 0.000 0.176 0.490 0.170 2.937.000 
OCFtoA~1 0.204 -0.005 0.081 0.255 5.160 2.344.000 
ROA 5.850 -1.593 4.263 18.006 11.227 2.927.000 
SPOS 0.139 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.346 3.000.000 
LOSS 0.091 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.287 3.000.000 
       
  
                                                 
12
 Logarithm values were inverted to millions. 
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Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all the countries included in our sample for the 
mean of discretionary accruals between 2012 and 2016. We detect that the majority of our 
sample is concentrated on which is the United Kingdom with a mean of 0,0211. Particular 
notice has to be taken that the United Kingdom has the largest mean in all of our sample.  
Then, we proceed on France and Germany that have a mean of 0,0094 and 0,051 respectively 
and we note that they also have a relatively high mean of discretionary accruals when 
compared to the rest of our sample. On the other hand, Ireland is the only region in our 
sample that has a negative mean. Overall, we observe that in the vast majority of our sample 
the discretionary accruals are statistically significant, 
 
 
Table 3: Univariate T-tests for mean ODA by Year and by Country 
 
allcountries[16,4]: 
T-Tests of Mean discretionary Accruals by Country 
     
Mean Mean T-Test 
p-
value 
Count 
Austria 0.0094 10.459 0.3094 19.0000 
Belgium 0.0096 13.750 0.1772 39.0000 
Czech 
Republic 
0.0052 22.190 0.0907 5.0000 
Denmark 0.0079 13.809 0.1713 78.0000 
Finland 0.0104 21.694 0.0342 58.0000 
France 0.0094 52.128 0.0000 353.0000 
Germany 0.0151 54.418 0.0000 273.0000 
Ireland -0.0010 -0.1478 0.8834 34.0000 
Italy 0.0152 40.860 0.0001 97.0000 
Netherlands 0.0111 26.286 0.0099 105.0000 
Norway 0.0002 0.0275 0.9782 41.0000 
Portugal 0.0036 0.8575 0.4134 10.0000 
Spain 0.0120 23.746 0.0198 85.0000 
Sweden 0.0053 15.422 0.1250 160.0000 
Switzerland 0.0044 17.054 0.0903 143.0000 
United 
Kingdom 
0.0211 106.363 0.0000 614.0000 
      
 
Table 4 reports the correlation matrices for the variables we used in our study with 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. The correlations among our variables are reasonably 
expected, but we can observe that there are some cross-correlations also that could potentially 
raise issues. In order to address this problem, we treated our variables so as to avoid 
21 
 
collinearity. We note that there is a significant positive correlation at the level of 0.01 among 
WODA and BIG4. Furthermore, at the significance level of 0.05, there is a positive 
relationship with small positive earnings. WODA also has a negative relationship with cash 
flow from operations and the changes in market value. 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
           
 
WODA WODA WLAF NAFEE IMPORT AUDITOR~H BIG4 LRevenue LMValue LEV OCFtoAS~1 ROA SPOS LOSS 
b b b b b b b b b b b b b b 
WODA 1.000 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
WLAF -0.050 1.000 . . . . . . . . . . . 
NAFEE -0.008 0.193*** 1.000 . . . . . . . . . . 
IMP~T -0.011 0.269*** 0.831*** 1.000 . . . . . . . . . 
AUD~SW~ 0.057 -0.006 -0.017 -0.003 1.000 . . . . . . . . 
big4 0.065* 0.054 0.038 0.017 -0.108*** 1.000 . . . . . . . 
LRevenue  -0.034 0.332*** 0.095** 0.109*** 0.024 0.028 1.000 . . . . . . 
LMValuee 
 -
0.120*** 
0.273*** 0.091** 0.093** -0.029 0.016 0.579*** 1.000 . . . . . 
LEV  -0.026 -0.020 0.029 -0.005 0.058 0.050 -0.068* -0.075** 1.000 . . . . 
OCFtoAs~1 
-
0.169*** 
-0.091** -0.011 -0.018 -0.081** 0.031 -0.227*** 0.028 
-
0.129*** 
1.000 . . . 
ROA -0.022 -0.073** -0.007 -0.024 -0.078** 0.046 -0.246*** 0.000 
-
0.175*** 
0.897*** 1.000 . . 
SPOS 0.074** -0.018 0.020 0.010 0.076** 0.034 0.015 -0.007 0.031 -0.096*** 
-
0.101*** 
1.000 . 
LOSS -0.010 -0.038 0.004 0.022 0.038 
-
0.064* 
0.093** 0.038 0.038 -0.079** 
-
0.219*** 
-0.049 1.000 
N 727.000 
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ii. Regression Results  
 
Table 5 presents the results of our panel data regressions at the significance level of 1%, 5% 
and 10%. In addition, all of our models were estimated with country and year effects. We 
estimate our first model “Controls” on which we include only our controls variables and we 
notice three out of our eight variables are significant at 1% and 5% threshold. Operating cash 
flow to assets is negatively and has a strong significance at 1% level, return on assets is also 
negative and significant at 1%. The variable that depicts loss at y-1  is significant and 
negative at 5%. The aforementioned variables retain their significance along with their 
coefficients at all our models, apart from our variable that depicts small positive earnings 
which are negative and significant on 5% on all of our models but from our first model. 
 
The explanatory power of our baseline model is overall satisfactory with a value of R
2
= 
13,5%. We proceed by estimating four models in which we examine each one of our four 
main variables with our control variables. Worth mentioning is the fact that we notice a 
significant increase in the explanatory power of our model, that leads us to our final model 
with R
2
=40,01% which is depicted in the last column. We identify that our variable Auditor 
Switch is negative and significant at 5% as we expected and it is consistent with the findings 
of Chi et al. (2010) that observed that discretionary accruals increased significantly on firms 
with longer auditor’s tenure. Our next variable that includes audit fees has a negative 
association with our earnings benchmarks and it is significant at the 5 % level, consequently, 
those findings are in line with our second hypothesis. In addition, our results are in line with 
prior literature
13
 which suggests that higher audit fees are indicative of higher audit effort 
and audit quality, hence lower earnings manipulation. Non-audit fees variables appear to 
have a strong negative association with discretionary accruals on the 1% significance level 
which is a result that contravenes with our expectations that the provision of non-audit could 
impair audit quality. However, it is consistent with the evidence of Arruiada (1999) who 
identified that an auditor can place constraints on client’s demands by not consenting to 
client’s pressure and acquiesce on earnings manipulation as the provision of non-audit 
services increase their investment in reputational capital. Our last variable that attests the 
importance of each client appears to have a weak negative association at 10%, therefore we 
cannot conclude on our hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
13
 Becker et al. (1998); Johnson et al. (2002); Balsam et al. (2003); Srinidhhi and Gul et al. (2006); Ashbaugh 
et al. (2003) 
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Table 5: Panel Data Regressions with WODA 
  
  
Controls 
Aud. 
Switch 
Audit 
Fees NA Fees Importance Full Model    
b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t    
Constant 
0.031** 0.031** 0.023 0.028* 0.030** 0.018    
(2.302) (2.281) (1.603) (1.835) (2.092) (1.148) 
Big 4 Auditor 
0.005 0.005 0.009** 0.006 0.008* 0.008    
(1.317) (1.328) (2.143) (1.159) (1.807) (1.530) 
Revenue 
-0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002    
(-0.133) (-0.134) (0.693) (0.256) (0.122) (0.954)    
Changes in MV 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000    
(-0.589) (-0.580) (-0.580) (-0.560) (-0.613) (-0.263)    
Leverage 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014    
(-0.173) (-0.178) (-0.902) (-0.932) (-1.078) (-1.157)    
Operating 
Cash flows to 
Assets 
-0.235*** 
-
0.235*** 
-
0.239*** -0.222*** -0.239*** -0.227*** 
(-5.784) (-5.784) (-5.601) (-4.697) (-5.400) (-4.803)    
Return on 
Assets 
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(4.464) (4.468) (4.464) (3.850) (4.325) (3.962) 
Small Positive 
Earnings 
0.007 0.007 0.016** 0.015* 0.016** 0.014**  
(1.175) (1.173) (2.502) (1.960) (2.294) (1.869) 
Loss at Y-1 
0.015** 0.015** 0.018** 0.018* 0.016** 0.014**    
(2.011) (2.007) (2.068) (1.957) (1.983) (1.612) 
Auditor Switch 
  0.001       0.006** 
  (0.202)       (1.660) 
Audit Fees 
    -0.002*     -0.003**  
    (-1.811)     (-2.506)    
Non Audit Fees 
      0.005*   -0.004*** 
      (0.800)   (-0.564)    
Client 
Importance 
        0.004 0.011*   
        (0.976) (1.889) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
Country 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
              
r2_w 0.074 0.073 0.044 0.030 0.037 0.028    
r2_b 0.135 0.136 0.260 0.263 0.271 0.401    
r2_o 0.146 0.146 0.186 0.180 0.186 0.197    
N 1.199.000 1.199.000 889.000 738.000 851.000 727.000 
    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
       
 
iii. Sensitivity & Robustness Checks 
The focal point of our study examines the association of discretionary accruals with client’s 
and auditor’s characteristics. To further enhance our understanding of this relationship and 
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verify the robustness of our model we perform three sensitivity checks described as per 
below. Additionally, to allay any concerns with respect to the validity of our results, we have 
computed discretionary accruals as the difference between actual and the mean of 
discretionary accruals instead of subtracting the expected accruals. Thus, we proceed into 
generating a new variable WODA2 that stands for the winsorized value of discretionary 
accruals and it is the difference between the actual and the mean of discretionary accruals. 
Our results reveal that our variables are significant at the same levels and directions and that 
our explanatory power of our model has increased significantly to 47,1%.  
 
Then on our next robustness test, we decide to verify our results on the country which has the 
majority of our observations and exclude all other countries, leaving us with a sample of 171 
firms or 28,33% of our total observations. Accordingly, we regress our variables only with 
firms from the United Kingdom and we identified that auditor switch has a negative 
association and is no longer significant, while audit fees remain negative but they appear to 
be strongly significant at 1%. Our results reveal that for our UK sample Non-audit fees are 
negatively associated with earnings manipulation and they are important at 5%. Likewise, 
Client importance has a negative and strong association and is significant at 1% level. The 
explanatory power of our United Kingdom model still remains high with an R-Square of 
46,8%. Our findings suggest that on United Kingdom high audit fees translates to higher 
audit quality, thus lower earnings management and increased client importance and provision 
of non-audit services lead to lower discretionary accruals.  
 
Our last sensitivity check focuses only on countries that concentrate the majority of our 
sample, therefore, we excluded all regions that had few observations, leaving us with a total 
sample of 456 firms or 76% of our total sample which was represented by UK, France, 
Germany, Switzerland and Sweden. Auditor switch and audit fees retain the same 
relationship with our earnings management benchmark likewise in our original test. In 
contrary, non-audit fees and client importance were no longer significant at any level. We 
conclude, that our study’s full sample was robust while comparing them with our alternative 
earnings manipulation benchmark, likewise for our results only for the United Kingdom with 
the exception of auditor switch. However, when we measured only for the majority of our 
sample only auditor switch and audit fees variables appeared to be significant. 
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Table 6: Panel Data Regressions of alternative benchmarks 
 
Panel Data Regressions - Robustness Tests 
     
    
  
Alt/ive 
WODA 
UK 
Only Ex.Small Countries 
  b/t b/t b/t    
Constant 
0.033* 0.012 0.021 
(1.835) (0.382) (1.255) 
Big 4 
Auditor 
-0.003 0.005 0.009* 
(-0.453) (0.288) (1.707) 
Revenue 
0.002 0.009** 0.002 
(1.127) (2.335) (0.960) 
Changes in 
MV 
0.002 
-
0.008*** -0.002 
(1.117) (-2.909) (-1.074) 
Leverage -0.019 
-
0.049*** -0.006 
(-1.016) (-2.692) (-0.381) 
Operating 
Cash flows 
to Assets 
-0.452*** -0.082 -0.206*** 
(-6.250) (-1.263) (-3.820) 
Return on 
Assets 
0.004*** 0.001 0.002*** 
(5.011) (0.887) (3.126) 
Small 
Positive 
Earnings 
-0.005 0.015 0.009 
(-0.608) (1.336) (1.072) 
Loss at Y-1 
0.029*** 0.010 0.004 
(2.632) (0.447) (0.355) 
Auditor 
Switch 
0.002** -0.006 0.009** 
(-0.416) (-0.887) (2.341) 
Audit Fees -0.004** 
-
0.017*** -0.004** 
(-2.062) (-4.177) (-2.471) 
Non Audit 
Fees 
-0.002*** 0.655** 0.043 
(-0.196) (2.124) (0.935) 
Client 
Importance 
0.012* 1.001*** 0.049 
(1.644) (3.872) (1.255) 
Year 
Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
Effects Yes Yes Yes 
        
r2_w 0.097 0.180 0.040 
r2_b 0.471 0.468 0.378 
r2_o 0.404 0.382 0.286 
N 894.000 195.000 606.000 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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V. Conclusions 
 
To the extent of our knowledge, this is considered to be the first study on European firms 
that assesses the relationship of discretionary accruals with client’s and auditor’s 
characteristics. We provide an overview of discretionary accruals for the largest European 
firms based on market capitalization during the period 2012 -2016 and their relationship with 
client’s and auditor’s characteristics by formulating four hypotheses (1) Audit Fees and 
Audit Quality, (2) Provision of Non-Audit Services and Discretionary Accruals, (3) Client’s 
Importance and Auditor’s Independence, (4) Effects of Auditor Tenure on Discretionary 
Accruals. Our evidence support our first hypothesis which is in line with prior literature
14
, 
also we expected that the increased provision of non-audit services would lead to economic 
bonding, resulting to higher earnings management; however, our findings reveal a strong 
negative association where auditors are inclined to conservative reporting due to increased 
investment in reputational capital (Arruiada et al. 1999). Regarding the client importance 
hypothesis, we do not find indicative evidence that it affected auditor’s opinion.  We further 
identify that longer auditor tenure could potentially decrease audit quality which implies 
higher earnings manipulation that is in line with previous studies of Chi et al. (2010). Results 
appear to be robust to multiple specifications apart from our model where we exclude 
countries with a small number of observations.  
 
We acknowledge the fact that our study is subjected to a number of limitations. For our 
earnings manipulation benchmark, we used discretionary accruals. The usage of accruals 
could be a noisy proxy when trying to estimate the quality of earnings. Nonetheless, we try 
estimating earnings quality with one of the most reliable and commonly used methods and 
ensure the robustness of our results through a number of sensitivity checks.  Then, our 
observations span over a limited timeframe which was defined by paramount changes in the 
regulatory framework and the European economy that mandates companies to self-report 
information regarding audit fees. Furthermore, we do understand that our sample is 
potentially biased as our sample consists of only listed companies which are considered to be 
leaders in their sectors, therefore certain patterns could exist on their reporting. Despite the 
fact that we use different fee models regarding client’s and auditor’s characteristics that seem 
to be well-specified according to prior literature, we cannot preclude the possibility of model 
misstatement and omitted variables.  We understand that we cannot rule out the possibility 
                                                 
14
 Becker et al. (1998); Johnson et al. (2002); Balsam et al. (2003); Srinidhhi and Gul et al. (2006); Ashbaugh 
et al. (2003) 
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that our results are driven by unobservable risks, to an unknown degree.  
 
Finally, our study contributes to the existing literature by documenting the impact of client’s 
and auditor’s characteristics to earnings management on European listed firms. Prior 
earnings management research has been dominated by studies that assess this relationship on 
US firms. An intriguing topic for future research could be how earnings management is 
driven by client importance and the role of audit quality. Earnings management has always 
fascinated researchers and it seems that it will linger the research community for quite some 
time. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 7: Specification of our multiple regression model, variable measurement and 
predictions as to the sign of the explanatory variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Predicted 
Sign of 
coefficient 
Dependent Variable   
WODA 
Winzorized value of discretionary accruals for firm 
i in year t, as per Modified Jones Model (Dechow 
et al. 1995) 
- 
Independent & Control Variables   
AUDITOR_SWITCH 
Dummy 1, if auditor has changed the previous year 
on firm i, otherwise zero 
+ 
WLAF 
Winsorized value of the logarithm of audit fees for 
firm i 
- 
NAFEE Non-audit fees for firm i + 
Big4 
Dummy 1, if firm i has a Big4 auditor, otherwise 
zero 
- 
IMPORT 
Audit fees for firm i, in year t to total audit fees per 
country 
+ / - 
ROA 
Income before extraordinary items for firm i in 
year t divided by total average assets of firm i in 
year t 
- 
LEV 
Long term debt of firm i in year t  to  total asset of 
firm i in year t 
- 
LRevenue Logarithm of revenues for firm i in year t + / - 
LMVALUE 
Logarith of changes in market value for firm i 
from year t to t-1 
- 
LOSS 
Dummy 1, if firm i for year t-1 reported losses, 
otherwise zero 
- 
OCFtoASSET_t_1 
Operation from cash flow for firm i in year t, 
scaled by lagged total assets 
- 
SPOS 
Dummy 1, if firm i in year t has reported marginal 
earnings, otherwise 0 
+ 
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Table 8: Robustness test only on UK firms 
Random-effects GLS regression 
 
Number of obs = 195 
Group variable: FIRM 
  
Number of groups =  88 
       R-sq:  within  = 0.1799 
   
 Obs per group: min = 1 
between = 0.4675                                         avg = 2.2 
     overall = 0.3824 max = 4 
      Wald chi2(15) = . 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)                     
  
Prob > chi2 =  . 
(Std. Err. Adjusted for 88 clusters in A) 
Robust 
WODA Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
WLAF -.0173604 .0041563 -4.18 0.000 -.0255065 -.0092143 
NAFEE .6550051 .308363 2.12 0.034 .0506248 1.259385 
IMPORT 1.000.795 .2584374 3.87 0.000 .4942672 1.507323 
AUDITOR_SWITCH -.0055534 .0062616 -0.89 0.375 -.017826 .0067191 
big4 .0047475 .0164765 0.29 0.773 -.0275458 .0370409 
LRevenue .0093581 .0040079 2.33 0.020 .0015028 .0172134 
LMValue -.0084664 .0029103 -2.91 0.004 -.0141704 -.0027623 
LEV -.0485295 .0180302 -2.69 0.007 -.083868 -.013191 
OCFtoASSETS_t_1 -.0816287 .0646325 -1.26 0.207 -.2083062 .0450487 
ROA .0006317 .0007125 0.89 0.375 -.0007648 .0020281 
SPOS .0147513 .0110403 1.34 0.182 -.0068873 .03639 
LOSS .0101813 .0227878 0.45 0.655 -.034482 .0548445 
COUNTRY_D1 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D2 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D3 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D4 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D5 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D6 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D7 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D8 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D9 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D10 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D11 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D12 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D13 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D14 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D15 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D16 0 (omitted) 
    Year_D1 0 (omitted) 
    Year_D2 -.0095507 .0083972    -1.14    0.255 -.0260089     .0069074 
Year_D3 .0171572 .0090514    1.90    0.058 -.0005833     .0348977 
Year_D4 .0226383 .0075696      2.99    0.003 .0078021     .0374744 
Year_D5 0 (omitted) 
    _cons .0122347 .0320661     0.38    0.703 -.0506137     .0750831 
       sigma_u .01320219 
     sigma_e .03941788 
     rho .10086291 (fraction of variance due to u_i)   
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Table 9: Robustness test on the majority of the sample 
Random-effects GLS regression 
  
Number of obs = 606 
Group variable: FIRM 
   
Number of groups = 265 
       R-sq:  within  = 0.0398 
   
Obs per group: min - 1 
between = 0.3782 avg = 2.3 
    overall = 0.2856 
 
max = 4 
    Wald chi2(21) = . 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed) 
    
Prob > chi2 = . 
(Std. Err. Adjusted for 265 clusters in A) 
Robust 
WODA Coef. Std. Err.       z     P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
WLAF -.0041234 .0016688     -2.47 0.013 -.0073942 -.0008525 
NAFEE .0427555 .0457165 0.94 0.350 -.0468472 .1323581 
IMPORT .0491557 .0391783 1.25 0.210 -.0276324 .1259437 
AUDITOR_SWITCH .0090478 .0038647 2.34 0.019 .0014732 .0166225 
big4 .0088244 .0051693 1.71 0.088 -.0013072 .018956 
LRevenue .0018167 .0018934 0.96 0.337 -.0018942 .0055276 
LMValue -.0015146 .0014108     -1.07 0.283 -.0042797 .0012506 
LEV -.0056547 .0148336     -0.38 0.703 -.0347281 .0234186 
OCFtoASSETS_t_1 -.206412 .054028     -3.82 0.000 -.312305 -.1005191 
ROA .0019151 .0006127      3.13 0.002 .0007142 .003116 
SPOS .0085491 .0079755      1.07 0.284 -.0070826 .0241808 
LOSS .0035835 .0100806      0.36 0.722 -.0161741 .023341 
COUNTRY_D1 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D2 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D3 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D4 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D5 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D6 -.0175636 .0054029     -3.25 0.001 -.0281532  -.0069741 
COUNTRY_D7 -.0124725 .0054937     -2.27 0.023 -.0232399 -.0017051 
COUNTRY_D8 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D9 -.0116429 .0094446    -1.23 0.218 -.0301541 .0068683 
COUNTRY_D10 -.0182208 .007619     -2.39 0.017 -.0331539  -.0032878 
COUNTRY_D11 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D12 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D13 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D14 -.0291459 .0081334     -3.58 0.000 -.0450871 -.0132046 
COUNTRY_D15 -.0359545 .0065512     -5.49 0.000 -.0487947 -.0231144 
COUNTRY_D16 0 (omitted) 
    Year_D1 0 (omitted) 
    Year_D2 .0006245 .0043629     0.14 0.886 -.0079266  .0091756 
Year_D3 .0094728 .0044851     2.11 0.035 .0006821 .0182635 
Year_D4 .0061489 .0038409     1.60 0.109 -.0013792  .013677 
Year_D5 0 (omitted) 
    _cons .021115 .0168194     1.26 0.209 -.0118504 .0540805 
       sigma_u .01709771 
     sigma_e .0351802 
     rho .19106919 (fraction of variance due to u_i)   
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Table 10: Robustness test with WODA2 
Random-effects GLS regression 
  
Number of obs = 894 
Group variable: FIRM 
   
Number of groups = 394 
       R-sq:  within  = 0.0974 
   
 Obs per group: min = 1 
between = 0.4712 avg = 2.3 
     overall = 0.4039 max = 4 
     Wald chi2(28)      =    189.05 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) 
   
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 394 clusters in A) 
Robust 
WODA2 Coef. Std. Err. z  P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
WLAF -.0036285 .0017593 -2.06 0.039 -.0070767 -.0001803 
NAFEE -.0024028 .0122898 -0.20 0.845 -.0264903 .0216848 
IMPORT .0115228 .0070085 1.64 0.100 -.0022135 .0252591 
AUDITOR_SWITCH -.0018958 .0045606 -0.42 0.678 -.0108345 .0070428 
big4 -.0031409 .0069331 -0.45 0.651 -.0167295 .0104477 
LRevenue .0021673 .0019235 1.13 0.260 -.0016027 .0059372 
LMValue .0018694 .001674 1.12 0.264 -.0014115 .0051504 
LEV -.0190012 .0187058 -1.02 0.310 -.0556638 .0176615 
OCFtoASSETS_t_1 -.4518947 .0722977 -6.25 0.000 -.5935956 -.3101938 
ROA .0041625 .0008306 5.01 0.000 .0025345 .0057904 
SPOS -.0046411 .0076278 -0.61 0.543 -.0195913 .0103092 
LOSS .0290363 .01103 2.63 0.008 .007418 .0506546 
COUNTRY_D1 -.0046452 .014542 -0.32 0.749 -.033147 .0238565 
COUNTRY_D2 -.0290773 .011611 -2.5 0.012 -.0518345 -.0063202 
COUNTRY_D3 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D4 -.0440032 .0141253 -3.12 0.002 -.0716884 -.0163181 
COUNTRY_D5 -.0338289 .0143497 -2.36 0.018 -.0619539 -.005704 
COUNTRY_D6 -.0335916 .0068274 -4.92 0.000 -.0469731 -.0202102 
COUNTRY_D7 -.034383 .0064112 -5.36 0.000 -.0469487 -.0218174 
COUNTRY_D8 -.0554427 .0131296 -4.22 0.000 -.0811764 -.0297091 
COUNTRY_D9 -.0471034 .0106878 -4.41 0.000 -.0680511 -.0261557 
COUNTRY_D10 -.0085194 .0143217 -0.59 0.552 -.0365895 .0195506 
COUNTRY_D11 -.0454481 .0204184 -2.23 0.026 -.0854675 -.0054287 
COUNTRY_D12 0 (omitted) 
    COUNTRY_D13 -.04089 .006632 -6.17 0.000 -.0538884 -.0278916 
COUNTRY_D14 -.0539701 .0116409 -4.64 0.000 -.0767859 -.0311543 
COUNTRY_D15 -.0367796 .0073895 -4.98 0.000 -.0512627 -.0222965 
COUNTRY_D16 0 (omitted) 
    Year_D1 0 (omitted) 
    Year_D2 .0117494 .0053668 2.19 0.029 .0012307 .0222681 
Year_D3 -.0027322 .0052199 -0.52 0.601 -.012963 .0074985 
Year_D4 .0065552 .0045766 1.43 0.152 -.0024147 .0155252 
Year_D5 0 (omitted) 
    _cons .0334843 .0182497 1.83 0.067 -.0022845 .0692532 
       sigma_u .03081901 
     sigma_e .04908299 
     rho .28277027 (fraction of variance due to u_i)   
